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Abstract
This paper investigates how the possibility to ostracise, which is a familiar punishment
mechanism to subjects in an experiment, a⁄ects harvest in a common pool resource experiment.
The experiment was framed as a ￿shing problem and the subjects were young ￿shers in Ghana.
We ￿nd that the introduction of the possibility to ostracise other members of a group at a
cost to the remaining members of a group decreased over-￿shing signi￿cantly in comparison
with the situation where ostracism was not possible. The ostracism was based on at least 50-
percent voting rule. Moreover, the subjects demonstrated a strong desire to ostracise those who
over-￿shed.
JEL Classi￿cation: C92; D72; Q22
KEYWORDS: Common Pool Resource; Experiment; Ostracism; Fishers
1 Introduction
It is well-known that natural resources, such as ￿sh stocks, grazing lands, and forest stocks are
generally managed as common pool resources in developing countries. However, common pool
resources, if not properly managed, could be over-exploited, a situation referred to as ￿the tragedy
of the commons￿in Hardin (1968). Several ways to overcome this problem have been discussed in the
literature. For example, Dietz et al. (2003) discussed restriction of access which, according to Hardin
(1968), could either occur through privatising an unregulated common pool resource or keeping it as
a public property but restricting the right to entry, and/or creating incentives to mitigate overuse
of the resource. In many developing countries, including Ghana, formal institutions responsible for
regulating the appropriation of environmental resources are generally very weak, hence the drive
towards a policy of devolution of responsibility and control over natural resources from government
agencies to resource users (Ostrom, 1990; Meinzen et al., 2002).
In most cases, social norms may complement or substitute formal institutions. It is known that
rules and social norms impact behaviour and attitude towards the use of natural resources. Although,
as argued by Bowles (1998), markets and other economic institutions in￿ uence the evolution of
human values, the threat of social sanctions may make it rational, from the cost-bene￿t viewpoint,
to abide by norm-guided behaviours (Jon, 1989). This paper therefore investigates the e⁄ect of
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1ostracism or social exclusion, which is a familiar punishment mechanism to subjects in an experiment,
and common in developing countries, in the appropriation of a common pool ￿shery. As noted by
Ho⁄man and Goldsmith (2004), ostracism is continuously operating in every set of human relations
in all cultures.
Evidently, social dilemma experiments in a laboratory setting, without any form of formal or
informal institutions, or communication among the members, have generally found over-exploitation
at levels close to what is predicted for complete rational self-interestedness (see e.g. Walker et al.,
1990; Cardinas, 2003; Casari and Plott, 2003). Recent experimental studies on common pool re-
sources and public goods have focused on the e⁄ect of allowing di⁄erent methods of punishment
among members in a group. Ostrom et al. (1992) and Cardenas et al. (2000) found that coopera-
tion and average earnings increase if monetary sanctioning is available in a common pool resource
experiment. Similarly, monetary punishment in a public good experiment introduced by Fehr and
G￿chter (2000), resulted in a signi￿cant increase in the contribution to a public good, although it
was costly to the punisher.1 2
Although ostracism or social exclusion is a common social sanction in developing countries, only
a small number of studies have employed ostracism as a treatment in social dilemma experiments
(e.g. Masclet, 2003; Cinyabuguma et al., 2005) to investment its impact on free-rider behaviour.
Masclet (2003) designed a linear public good experiment that had two stages in each period and
a subject could only be ostracised from the second stage activity in each period. Two treatments
were considered: costly ostracism (which was enforceable if at least one member voted for ostracism)
to any subject who voted to ostracise, and costless ostracism. It was found that the possibility of
exclusion from the second public good experiment increased average contributions to the ￿rst public
good. Cinyabuguma et al. (2005) introduced ostracism based on at least 50-percent voting in a
public good experiment. A cost was imposed on those who voted to ostracise, if and only if the
subject who received the votes was ostracised. The ostracised members were then reassigned and
given only half of their previous endowment to the same public good experiment. Their results show
an almost maximal level of contribution to the public good among the non-excluded members.3 4 5
This paper reports results from a common pool resource experiment among young ￿shers in a
developing country where ostracism is a familiar punishment mechanism.6 In particular, we study
the impact of ostracism, which is an existing punishment mechanism, on levels of harvest7. The
1Similar results have been found in other public good experiments on students (e.g. Ostrom et al., 1992; and Bochet
et al., 2006). G￿chter et al. (2004) found that some de￿nitions of trust have a signi￿cant impact on contribution in a
public good experiment in Russia. Carpenter et al. (2004) had similar ￿ndings in their experiments in Vietnam and
Thailand.
2Other institutions include e.g. introduction of the possibility of communicating disapproval in a public good
experiment as a form of non-monetary punishment (see Masclet et al., 2003). The results of Masclet et al. (2003), for
example, indicated a higher level of contribution to the public good after its introduction, but the positive e⁄ect on
cooperation from the possibility of non-monetary punishment declined over time in their experiment. In a common
pool experiment, Ostrom et al. (1992) found that by allowing face-to-face communication within groups, average net
yield increased compared to the baseline situation where no communication was allowed.
3Interestingly, the e⁄ects on net earnings are positive and signi￿cant, which is uncommon in public goods experi-
ments with monetary punishment. Masclet (2003) and Soest and Vyrastekova (2004) conducted an experiment with a
one-period ostracism from a second activity in that period. In the former case, a public good experiment was followed
by a second public good experiment in each period, while in the latter case a common pool resource experiment was
followed by a gift exchange.
4Baland and Platteau (2000) noted that ostracism will result in cooperation, i.e. adopting the social optimum
strategy, if the voting is based on a majority rule and if the decision to ostracise is irrevocable. A similar argument
is found in Hirshleifer and Rasmusen (1989) where a prisoner￿ s dilemma game was solved recursively.
5Cardenas et al. (2000) found that when people get used to imperfect monitoring, they rapidly move towards
self-interested choices.
6Murphy and Cardenas (2004) present an excellent introduction on how to conduct a common pool resource
experiment. Furthermore, some examples of experiments with subjects who face social dilemmas in resource extraction
in their daily lives include Cardenas (2003); Carpenter and Seki (2005); and Gaspart and Seki (2003). There are several
studies that compare student with non-student subjects. Other studies that compare the two groups of subjects in
public good experiment include Carpenter et al. (2004) and List (2004).
7Ostracism as a punishment mechanism exists in all rural communities in Ghana and is usually applied as the last
2paper combines the features of the work of Masclet (2003) and Cinyabuguma et al. (2005). To
mimic the reality, it is assumed that the ostracism applies to the single activity, i.e. the ￿shing,
and it is permanent. Moreover, the experiment involves real subjects in a developing country where
ostracism is a familiar punishment mechanism. The results from our experiment show that without
the possibility to ostracise, over-￿shing is substantial. When ostracism was introduced, subjects
were ostracised although it was costly for the remaining members to ostracise a member. Moreover,
as a result of the introduction of ostracism, there was a sharp decline in over-￿shing compared to a
baseline treatment in which it was not possible to ostracise. The results from our experiment can
be viewed in the light of the fact that, in the absence of external sanctions, internalized norms may
not be su¢ cient in regulating resource appropriation. Consequently, for example, a ￿shing licensing
system with decentralised monitoring which makes it possible to withdraw the license upon violation
might be a feasible policy tool to regulate over-￿shing.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In the next section, we introduce our speci￿c
experimental design, and the organisation of the experiment is in section 3. The results of the
experiment are presented in section 4 and section 5 concludes the paper.
1.1 Experimental design
In our experiment, each group consists of 8 members and the total endowment of time for labour
activities in a period is set to 8, which is framed as 8 months in a year to mimic the maximum
number of months a ￿sher could ￿sh within a year.8 Member ican allocate the total time available
to him/her to ￿shing, which is denoted xi, and other activities, which correspond to 8 ￿ xi. We
assume that there is no alternative work option for the ￿shers and this resembles the common
situation in most ￿shing villages in Ghana. Following the literature on common pool resource, we
assume that the aggregated production function is ￿hump-shaped￿and this is speci￿ed as a two-
piece linear production function (e.g. Dasgupta and Heal, 1974; Ostrom et al., 1992; Fischer et al.,
2004). The pay-o⁄ of the group is presented in equation (1)




0 ￿ x ￿ 24
24 ￿ x ￿ 64 (1)
The pay-o⁄ to member i does not only depend on how many months he/she had ￿shed, but also the
total amount of months that the other group members had ￿shed.








0 ￿ x ￿ 24
24 ￿ x ￿ 64 (2)
The aggregated social optimum level is 24 months, which corresponds to a symmetric social optimal
level of 3 months per year for each member. Without any social sanction, the self-interested ￿sher
will do what is best for him by ￿shing for more months than the social optimal number of months.
Based on equation (E2), we constructed the payo⁄ matrix that was handed out to the subjects in
the experiment (see Appendix I). In the pay-o⁄ matrix, the columns indicate the number of months
a given member ￿shed, while the rows show the total number of months the rest of the members
￿shed. All possible combinations of the earnings from ￿shing for member i can be read from the
matrix. The exchange rate used for the payment in the experiment was 35 Cedis for 1 experimental
currency unit.9 If each member spends the social optimum amount of time of 3 months, the payo⁄
for each equals to 624 Cedis.
resort when any social norm is violated, e.g. stealing, ￿ghting, adultery, etc.
8In all ￿shing communities in Ghana, ￿shing is strictly prohibited one day per week. The day varies across
communities. Moreover, ￿shing does not normally take place on Sundays since most ￿shers go to church, mend their
nets or attend social gatherings, such as marriage ceremonies and funerals. Thus, on average, a ￿sher goes ￿shing
about ￿ve days in a week and this approximately adds up to 8 months in a year, as in our experiment.
935 Cedis is the Ghanaian currency equivalent to US$0.036 at the time of the experiment. From personal enquiry
at the time of the experiment, the average earning of a ￿sher within Anyako (the area where the experiment was
3The common pool resource experiment is run for 30 periods and we use two di⁄erent treatments
in the experiment, following a similar set up in Cardenas et al. (2000). In both treatments, the
￿rst 15 periods consisted of an ordinary common pool resource experiment after which there was a
break. After the break, the experiment continued for another 15 periods, and this was known at the
beginning of the experiment. Half of the sample continued with the ordinary common pool resource
experiment, while ostracism was introduced in the other half. Theoretically, for any common pool
resource problem with a large number of potential users, if a member of the group is ostracised,
average earnings for the aggregate social optimum number of months will increase for the remaining
members of the group. However, in real life ￿shery, members in a group interact in many ways that
enhance mutual bene￿ts. For example, ￿shermen in Ghana collectively help each other to retrieve
lost or entangled nets at sea, haul the ￿shing boats, carry and dry ￿shing nets after landing and
serve as watchdogs in protecting ￿shing equipment from theft, which are activities that bene￿t a
larger group. Thus ostracising a member will have a negative e⁄ect on the remaining group members
in the mentioned contexts. The size of these e⁄ects may however vary across the ￿shers, but we
assume in our experiment that these e⁄ects, which are expressed as costs, are the same across all the
remaining members in the group. To account for this loss, a cost was introduced in the experiment.
Moreover, the cost is set such that irrespective of the number of months a ￿sher ￿shes, it would
always be costly to ostracise a member. The cost was calculated by comparing the payo⁄s in two
di⁄erent situations. In one situation, all ￿shers except one ￿shed for the social optimal number of
months while the deviating ￿sher ￿shed for the maximum possible months. This was compared to
another situation where the deviating member had been ostracised, and the group only consisted of
members ￿shing at the social optimal level. For example, if all but one member ￿shed at the social
optimal number of months, i.e. 3 months, while the remaining subject ￿shes for 8 months, the payo⁄
to each member ￿shing 3 months is 54.1. In the situation with 7 subjects, i.e. in a situation where
the deviating member has been ostracised, the payo⁄ is 78 each. The di⁄erence between the two
payo⁄s is 24, and to make exclusion costly for the remaining members, we added a cost of 3 to make
the cost equal to 27, which implies that the net payo⁄ to each of the remaining subjects is 51 (i.e.
78-27).10 If a cost is imposed on the remaining members, member i￿ s return presented in equation








￿ 0:2xi ￿ ￿j
0 ￿ x ￿ 24
24 ￿ x ￿ 64 (3)
where ￿j is the cost of having j members ostracised. Thus, the catch rate per se is not a⁄ected,
but losses occur for other reasons as discussed above, and this results in a lower net return. In our
experiment, each member had the opportunity to vote to ostracise another member from his/her
group at the end of each period. Based on at least 50-percent voting, it was decided whether a
member was to be ostracised for a life time. In such a case, that member would not earn any money
in the subsequent periods of the experiment. This mimics the fact that if a ￿sher is ostracised
from a community, he/she no longer gets any income from the ￿shing activity and may also ￿nd it
di¢ cult to secure an alternative viable economic activity. The number of votes required to ostracise
a member and the cost of ostracism imposed on the remaining members are presented in Table A2
in Appendix II.
conducted) was about 70,000 Cedis (7.87 USD) per day and the length of a ￿shing day was on average 6 hours. This
was higher than the average earning of 40,233.30 Cedis (4.50 USD) in the experiment. However, the hourly wages
are approximately the same between ￿shing and taking part in the experiment. These levels had been set based on a
pilot experiment in May 2004.
10Similarly, if the group consists of 7 subjects and a subject is ostracised, the remaining 6 subjects will get an
average payo⁄ of 104 if each invests the social optimal level of e⁄ort of, in this case, 4 months. To make the exclusion
costly, we added 3 to the di⁄erence between 104 and 51, thus making the cost of exclusion equal to 56. Following the
same procedure, 3 was added to the cost if an additional individual is excluded.
41.2 Organisation of the experiment
The experiment was conducted in Anyako, a ￿shing community in the Volta region, which is one
of ten administrative regions of Ghana. The region is rich in freshwater ￿sh, such as tilapia, but
intense ￿shing activities has led to over-exploitation of many of the species. Anyako is located in the
Keta Lagoon basin in the southern part of the Volta region, where occupation possibilities, except
for occupations related to ￿shing, are very limited. Normally, the men in ￿shing communities in
Ghana are involved directly in ￿shing and maintenance of the boats, and ￿shing equipment, while
the women prepare and sell the catch (Walker, 2002). Although it is generally taboo for women to
go ￿shing in many ￿shing communities in Ghana, some of them are indirectly involved in ￿shing by
owning ￿shing boats and nets, which are operated by men on a share-contract basis. Thus, after
the variable cost of the ￿shing expedition is deducted, a proportion of the revenue from the catch,
usually a half, goes to the crew and the other half to the owner of the ￿shing gear. Moreover, some
women also give loans to male ￿shers in order to support their ￿shing activities. In Ghana, due to
a limited budget from government, the state institutions that are responsible for governing common
pool resources are generally weak. Consequently, ￿shing regulations have been decentralised to the
communities.11 A chief ￿sherman oversees all ￿shing activities within a ￿shing community,12 and
this gives him the power to implement traditional ￿shing laws, resolve ￿shing-related con￿ icts and
punish violators of the ￿shing laws. His decisions are made in consultation with his council of elders,
which usually consists of the head of each clan within the community. Once the chief ￿sherman
takes a decision, it is binding on all ￿shers within his community. The ￿shing laws, which operate
at community-level, do not di⁄er much across communities. For example, they include prohibition
of ￿shing on o⁄-￿shing days, which is usually one day in a week, and the use of destructive ￿shing
techniques and equipment such as dynamite, cyanide and/or DDT. The punishment for not obeying
the laws, which is decided by the chief ￿sherman, ranges from oral disapproval to life-time ostracism
depending on which law is violated. For example, whilst using child labour during school hours may
receive oral disapproval, ￿shing with poisons could receive ostracism as a punishment. Ostracism
is employed either as a direct sanction when some traditional ￿shing law is not obeyed or when a
￿sherman fails to pay a ￿ne imposed. There are, however, some di⁄erences regarding the structure
of punishment across communities.
Our sample is from students at the Anyako Secondary School, which is the highest institution
for formal education within the area, and is attended by teenagers and young adults from the area.
A week before the experiment, a pre-experimental questionnaire was administered to 168 of the
￿rst to third year Senior Secondary School students who volunteered to answer the questions. This
constituted slightly less than 70% of the 244 students enrolled at the school. All the students had
been informed a week before we conducted the pre-experimental questionnaire about this event at
a general meeting. One of the purposes of the pre-experimental questionnaire was to identify the
sample for the common pool resource experiment, which should only consist of individuals who were
currently involved in ￿shing activities. The respondents were asked a set of background questions,
mainly relating to personal characteristics and ￿shing experience. At the end, the subjects were also
asked whether they would be willing to participate in an ￿economic choice decision￿ , which was to
take place a week later. Each subject was given two versions of the questionnaire, one in Ewe13
and one in English. The questionnaire was developed in English and later translated into Ewe by
one translator and another translator did the reverse translation. Afterwards the translators met
and discussed any di⁄erences that have occurred, and agreed on the ￿nal wording. From the 168
subjects who took part in the pre-experimental questionnaire, we randomly selected 128 subjects
11In 1997, the ￿shery sector supported over 1.5 million people in Ghana, which constituted about 8.3% of the total
population (Atta-Mills et al., 2004).
12The position of a chief of a community is hereditary, but the chief ￿sherman, who is usually the most skilful
￿sherman, is elected. Traditionally, he occupies the position until his death.
13Ewe is the local language of Anyako. It is one of the nine government-sponsored languages in Ghana and spoken
by 13% of the Ghanaian population.
5who had some ￿shing experience. The average age of the students was 18.5 years. We conducted the
experiment on a weekday to reduce the potential problem of individuals not showing up. Moreover,
in order to encourage the subjects to attend, we asked the headmaster to announce the names of
those that had been selected to participate at a gathering of all the students of the school.
On the day of the common pool resource experiment, the identities of the randomly selected
subjects were checked against the list of names, and each subject was then given a numbered card
outside the room. These numbers assigned them to a pre-marked seat. The numbered cards were
also used to assign the subjects to the two treatments (i.e. the baseline and ostracism treatment).
Each treatment consisted of eight groups. The venue for the experiment was two halls, one for each
treatment group. The subjects took their seats at numbered but otherwise empty desks with enough
space between the desks to guarantee privacy when making their decisions. They were informed that
they were about to make ￿economic choice decisions￿ , and that the amount that each subject would
earn would depend on their own decisions as well as on the decisions made by the other subjects in
their group.
They then received the instructions of the game and the payo⁄matrix (see Appendix I). Moreover,
each subject was given 30 experimental cards, i.e. one card per period, to be handed to the instructor
indicating how many months they ￿shed during a speci￿c period, or year as framed in the experiment.
All 30 experimental cards were delivered before the experiment began to avoid a re-start e⁄ect in
period 16, i.e. the break motivated for resting and where we also introduced ostracism treatment
for half of the groups. Finally, the subjects were given one record sheet on which they recorded the
number of months that all the other members of their group ￿shed. This information was written
down on a sheet of paper and handed out by an instructor to each member of a group after each
round. This approach was chosen to avoid any e⁄ect from a di⁄erent degree of recall on behaviour.
The subjects were then given some time to read the instructions, and thereafter the instructor read
the instructions aloud, ￿rst in English and then in Ewe to all the subjects. The subjects then
answered six exercises in a language of their choice to test their understanding of the payo⁄ matrix.
The correct solutions, as well as how to obtain them from the payo⁄ matrix, were explained orally
and also written down on the chalkboard. Half of the sample, i.e. 64 subjects, sat in each of the
two halls.
In the experiment, we used partner matching but the subject remained anonymous to other
members in his/her group. In our case, it is natural to let the subjects remain in the same group to
replicate living in a community. The procedure during one period in the experiment was as follows:
the subjects ￿rst decided on how many months to spend on ￿shing, which was written down on the
experimental cards for that speci￿c period. These cards were then collected by one of the instructors.
The contributions and earnings were computed manually, and then written down on a sheet of paper
and handed to the members of each group, but no additional information was provided. After the
￿fteenth period, there was a break, which had been announced before the experiment began, giving
the subjects the opportunity to rest and to introduce the ostracism in half of the group. It was
stated in the instructions that they were not allowed to talk to each other during the experiment,
which also applied during the break, and the instructors were instructed to ensure that during the
break the subjects obeyed this rule.
In the ostracism treatment, the subjects were given information about the rules of ostracism at
the end of the break. They were informed that they had the opportunity to vote out a member
from their group. In order to be able to execute the selection, each subject was given 15 voting
cards. Each subject had the opportunity to vote after the information on the total and individual
months of ￿shing was handed out to him or her. The information was provided in the same way
as in the non-ostracism treatment during the ￿rst 15 periods, and in the baseline treatment after
period 15. The voting cards were then collected by one of the instructors, and if a subject refrained
from voting, an ￿X￿was entered on the card. Each member was then given a written feedback on
the number of votes he/she received in that period after which the experiment continued to the next
period. If an individual received the minimum number or more votes required for ostracism, he/she
6was orally informed by an instructor to leave the room.14 It was stressed that anyone could refrain
from voting if he/she desired to do so. If a subject was voted out, he/she would not continue to
take part in the experiment and thus would not have the possibility to earn any money from the
subsequent periods of the experiment. The decision to ostracise an individual was based on at least
50-percent voting as presented in Table A2. In total, the experiment lasted for 5 hours, consisting
of the ￿rst two hours for the ordinary CPR, and then a 15-minute break, and ￿nally two hours and
forty-￿ve minutes for the treated section.
All subjects were paid the following day. Their earnings were calculated and the amounts were
put in an envelope, which was sealed and the subject￿ s identi￿cation number was written on it.
The envelopes were then placed on a table in an unused classroom to be collected by the subjects.
Each subject entered the room through one door and left through another door. When the subject
entered the room, he/she showed his/her numbered identi￿cation card from the experiment of the
day before, to an instructor who did not assist during the common pool resource experiment. The
instructor was sitting at a nearby table ensuring that the right envelope was collected.
1.3 Results
Figure 1 presents the time paths of the average time spent ￿shing in the two treatments. The ￿gure
shows no signi￿cant di⁄erence between the two treatments during the ￿rst ￿fteen periods. However,
after ostracism was introduced, the time spent ￿shing declined sharply towards the social optimum
number of months compared to the baseline treatment. In both treatments, the time spent ￿shing
started from a level slightly above the social optimum of 24 during the ￿rst periods and increased
over time in the experiment. The over-￿shing increased over time and approached the Nash optimum
of 6 months.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Using a two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the average
time spent on ￿shing in the two treatments is the same during the ￿rst ￿fteen periods at 5%
signi￿cance level. After the introduction of ostracism, the time spent ￿shing decreased in these
groups to a level slightly above the social optimum number of months but statistically lower than
the Nash equilibrium, while in the baseline treatment, the time spent ￿shing continues to slowly
increase.15 During the last ￿fteen periods, we can reject the null hypotheses that the two treatments
are the same at 1% signi￿cance level using a two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test, which indicates that
the introduction of ostracism signi￿cantly a⁄ected the total time spent ￿shing.
Figure 2 shows the proportion of subjects who voted in the ostracism treatment, and the cumu-
lative proportion of ostracised members. As shown in the ￿gure, when the ostracism was introduced,
61% of the members voted in the ￿rst period to exclude another member in their group although
exclusion was costly to the remaining members in the subsequent periods. Three subjects were
ostracised in the ￿rst period, and an additional two subjects during the following 14 periods. It
should be noted that the subjects gained some experience with the common pool experiment since
they had taken part in the ￿rst 15 periods.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
14The pilot experiment indicated that ostracism would most likely to happen in the ￿rst period and this would have
resulted in letting ostracised subjects sit and wait for 2.5 hours. By keeping the ostracised members waiting, there is
a high possibility that they would be tempted to communicate with other subjects in the experiment. As a result, we
decided to let the ostracised members leave the hall.
15The average was computed as the total e⁄ort per group divided by eight even if some member(s) had already
been ostracised from the group. This approach is applied to make the results comparable between the baseline and
the ostracism treatment. This is because while the individual optimal level of ￿shing has changed, the total social
optimum level of ￿shing remains the same.
7The pattern of the graph showing the proportion of subjects who voted over time reveals some
inter-temporal dependency or an autoregressive process. Thus, over time, the proportion of subjects
who casted their votes to exclude miscreants from the game decreased because overharvesting dimin-
ished as e⁄ort levels got closer to the social optimum. This indicates that voting is not random but
motivated by the extent of overharvesting. A simple ordinary least square regression analysis, where
the proportion of the subjects who voted was regressed on a one period lag is reported in Table 1.
From the results, there exists a strong indication that the voting follows a ￿rst order autoregressive
process. On average, the proportion of votes in a period is approximately one-half the proportion
in the previous period.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Furthermore, we investigate the relationship between the number of votes received and e⁄ort
applied in the ￿shery in excess of the group average; and the determinants of the changes in the
number of months of ￿shing in the ostracism treatment. The determinants include: the level of trust
that the subject has in other students (rated on a 1-5 scale, with 1 being the highest); the number
of local associations or clubs that the subject belongs (denoted membership in our regression); if
the subject in reality ￿shes less than 21 days in a month (denoted low ￿shing intensity in our
regression); whether the subject has ever been caught violating a ￿shing regulation or not (denoted
violated ￿shing law in our regression); and the gender of the subject. The descriptive statistics of
these variables are presented in Table 2.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
In Table 3, the number of votes received was regressed on positive deviation from group average,
i.e. the amount of e⁄ort the individual applied in the ￿shing activity in excess of the average e⁄ort of
his/her group:As expected, positive deviation has a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on votes received.
The coe¢ cient indicates that if an individual on the average applied a unit of e⁄ort in excess of
his/her group average, approximately one individual within his/her group voted against him/her16.
Note that since the maximum number of votes that a subject could receive in each round is 8 and
the minimum is zero, the regression is estimated as a panel Tobit model. The results presented in
Table 4 show that in the ostracism treatment, the only signi￿cant e⁄ect on the change in months of
￿shing was whether a subject, on average, received a vote or not.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
[Insert Table 4 about here]
1.4 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we ￿nd evidence that the introduction of ostracism a⁄ects the amount of time spent on
￿shing in a common pool resource experiment, which is framed as a ￿shery problem among young
￿shers in a ￿shing community in Ghana. The ￿shery sector in Ghana is currently characterized
by over-￿shing, weak formal institutions to regulate harvest, and a decentralized decision-making
process where the chief ￿sherman acts both as the maker of traditional ￿shing laws and enforcer of
the laws.
Our experiment shows that the introduction of the possibility to ostracise a members of a group,
based on a simple at least 50-percent voting rule, decreased over-￿shing signi￿cantly. Although it
was costly for non-ostracised members to ostracise a member, ostracism still took place. This ￿nding
is in line with work by, for example, Fehr and G￿chter (2000) and Cinyabuguma et al. (2005) where
subjects punished others although the punishment was at a cost to the punisher. Interestingly, of the
16We also estimated the model with a binary dependent variable of whether the individual received a vote or not
but the regression had a lower explanatory power relative to the case where the dependent variable is continuous.
85 members who were ostracised, 3 were ostracised in the ￿rst period of the ostracism treatment. From
the voting pattern in the experiment, by implication, two-thirds of the subjects in our sample would
always self-report violation of ￿shing laws. It is therefore likely that part of the problem related
to over-￿shing might be due to inadequate punishment of over-￿shers, or in reality ostracising a
member from the community does not often take place, or ostracised members quickly show remorse
and are reaccepted into the community. This may imply that the social ties are stronger than the
concern for over-￿shing. In addition, in reality there is the chance that an individual who over￿sh
may get away with the crime and as a result may not be ostracised. This may lower the extent of
compliance.
From a policy perspective, ostracism in our experiment could be permanent withdrawal of
community-based ￿shing licensing if a ￿sher violates a ￿shing law that is endogenously monitored.
Fishing licenses exist in many developing countries in Africa and Asia. However, at the heart of
the e⁄ectiveness of enforcement of ￿shing regulations with endogenous institutions is the availability
of adequate and reliable data on ￿sh stocks and harvest rates, which is taken for granted in our
experimental settings.
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Note: The social optimum corresponds to 24 months. 
 
 
Figure 2: Cumulative Proportion of Ostracised Individuals and Proportion of Individuals 
Voting per Period 
 
 
12Table 1: Votes casted in round t: Regression Results for Periods 16-30 
Variables Coefficients 
Votes casted in round  1 t −   0.51 (0.09)*** 
Constant   0.09 (0.03)** 
Observations 14 
R-squared   0.54 
Note: The robust standard errors are in parentheses.*,**,***  significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables 
Variable  
 
Description  Mean   Std. Dev. 
Votes Received    0.24  0.64 
Female   0.34  0.47 
Membership   2.13  1.26 
Low Fishing Intensity   Fished at most 21 days 




Trust in other students 
measured on a scale 
from 1 to 5 
2.95 1.40 
Violated Fishing Law  1 if violated fishing law 




Table 3: Determinants of Votes Received: Regression Results for Periods 18-29 
Variables Coefficients 
Positive Deviation from Others’ Group Average  1.126 (0.082)*** 
Constant   -2.939 (0.389)** 
Observations 715 
Number of Subjects  61 
Wald Chi2 (8)  190.57*** 
Note: The standard errors are in parentheses.*,**,***  significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Group 
dummies have been included in the regressions to control for group fixed effects. 
13Table 4: Determinants of Change in Months of Fishing: Regression Results for 
Periods 18-29 
  Model 1  Model 2 
Average Months of Fishing by Others in Previous  Round  -0.139  (0.088)  -0.144 (0.083) 
Votes Received  -0.676 (0.82)*** -0.697  (0.090)*** 
Female      0.014 (0.113) 
Membership    - 0.020 (0.053) 
Low Fishing Intensity       0.109 (0.107) 
Trust       0.010 (0.042) 
Violated Fishing Law    -0.186 (0.143) 
Constant   0.651 (0.325)**    0.601 (0.341)*  
Observations 835  835 
Number of Subjects  61  61 
R-squared 0.08  0.08 
Note: The standard errors are in parentheses.*,**,***  significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Group 


















INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EXPERIMENT 
 
Hello, and thank you for coming here today. Please read through these instructions carefully.  
DO NOT DISCUSS THE EXPERIMENT WITH OTHERS IN THE ROOM.  If you have 
any questions, please feel free to raise your hand and an instructor will come and help you. 
Before the experiment begins, everyone will be given the opportunity to ask questions.  Once 
the experiment has begun, you may still raise your hand if you have a question.  Talking with 
others during the experiment is NOT permitted. If you do, you will be asked to leave the room 
and forfeit all your earnings. 
 
In each round of the experiment, you have the opportunity to earn cash in Experimental 
Currency Units (ECU).  The experiment has two parts with each part consisting of 15 rounds. 
Once the experiment is over, we will compute your total earnings for both parts.  The following 
day all of you will be paid in cash.  You will be paid the Cedis equivalent of your experimental 
earnings at an exchange rate of 1 ECU = 35 Cedis in Cash.  The more you make in ECU, the 
more you will make in Cedis. We will ensure that none of the other students in the experiment 
knows how much you earned.  You will need your ID to collect your earnings the following day 





In this experiment you and seven others in this room will make a series of decisions on how 
many months to fish in a year.  In any one year, you can fish up to a maximum of 8 months 
but the quantity of fish you harvest will depend on the number of months the other members 
of your group harvest from the fishery. In each round, which corresponds to a year of fishing, 
you will have to decide, and declare, how many months you will spend in the fishery.    
 
 
The Payoff Table 
 
At the start of the experiment, you will receive a PAYOFF TABLE that should be read the 
same way as the one attached at the end of these instructions.  All participants will have the 
same payoff table as you.  This table contains all the information that you need to make your 
decision for each year of fishing. The numbers that are in the table correspond to the ECU 
that you would earn in each year for a given set of decisions. Each of you must decide the 
number of MONTHS that you want to spend in the fishery (in the columns from 0 to 8). 
 
To harvest in each round you must write the number of the current round and the number of 
months you have decided upon (this will be a number between 0 and 8) on an 
EXPERIMENTAL CARD that the instructor will give to you.  There is an example attached 
at the end of the instructions. 
 
After everyone has made his/her decision, the instructor will collect the 
EXPERIMENTAL CARDS from all 8 members of the group and will calculate the total 
number of months that the group decided to spend extracting from the fishery. When the 
instructor announces the group total, each of you will be able to calculate the ECU that 
you earned in that round. You will find an example below. 
 
 
15In this experiment, we assume that each individual has a maximum of 8 MONTHS each year to 
extract fish. On the PAYOFF TABLE, this corresponds to the columns from 0 to 8. Each of you 
must decide on the number of months, from 0 to 8, that you fish in each year. But to be able to 




Table A1: An Example of How the Payoff Table Works 
 
My Months In The Fishery 
 
  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
19 
49  52  55  58 60 63 64 66 67 
20 
47  51  53  56 59 61 62 64 65 
21 






























45  48  50  53 55 57 58 60 61 
 
 
1.  You decide that “My Months In The Fishery” will be 2. 
2.  The instructor collects all the Decision Cards and gives you a written feedback on the 
number of months each ID number spent in the fishery and the TOTAL number of months 
your group spent in the fishery.  
3.  Assuming that a TOTAL of 22 months were spent in the fishery, you know that “Their 




The First Record Sheet 
 
OK, let us look at how the experiment works in each round (i.e. each year).  Each participant 
will receive a FIRST RECORD SHEET like the one attached at the end of these instructions.  
 
Using Example 1 above, let us see how to use this FIRST RECORD SHEET. Suppose that you 
decided to spend 2 months in the fishery this round.  On the EXPERIMENTAL CARD, you 
should write 2 next to “My months in the fishery.” You must also write this number in the first 
column (A) of the FIRST RECORD SHEET. (You must enter your decision in 3 places: the 
EXPERIMENTAL CARD that you give to the instructor, the FIRST RECORD SHEET and the 
SECOND RECORD SHEET  both of which you hang onto …). 
 
The instructor will collect the EXPERIMENTAL CARDS from everyone in your group and 
will calculate the total number of months spent in the fishery by the whole group. The 
instructor will give everyone in the group written feedback on the number of months that each 
ID number in your group spent in the fishery and the TOTAL number of months that your 
group spent in the fishery.  Suppose that the total was 22 months. Write 22 in column B of the 
FIRST RECORD SHEET.  To calculate “Their months in the fishery”, subtract column A 
from column B, and record this in column C.  In our example, “their months in the fishery” is 
20.  To calculate your earnings, use the payoff table described earlier.  If “my months” equals 
2, and “their months” equals 20, then your earnings would be 53 ECU.  In this example, you 
would have written the following on your FIRST RECORD SHEET: 
16 
 
FIRST RECORD SHEET 
 
ID: _____________________________________ 











Months in the 
Fishery 
 
(Given by the 
Instructor) 
Their Months in 
the Fishery 
 
(Column B minus 
Column A) 






1  2  22  20  53 




Second Record Sheet: 
 
It is very important to understand that nobody will know what your decisions were in each 
year or what you have earned from the experiment because only your ID number will be used 
throughout. Written feedback on both the group total and the months spent in the fishery by 
each ID number in your group will be given to you at the end of each round by the instructor.  
Record the individual months and the group total on the SECOND RECORD SHEET 




SECOND RECORD SHEET 
ID_______________________________  
 





1 2 3  4 5 6  7 8 Group  Total 
1             
2             
3             
4             




           
30             
 
 





17Summary of Steps for Harvesting One Round of the Experiment 
 
How it is Done: In each round, you must decide how many months, between 0 and 8, you 
want to devote in one year in extracting resources from a fishery. Your earnings in each round 
depend on both your decision and the decisions made by the other members of your group, 
according to the PAYOFF TABLE. 
 
What you need: To take part, you need a PAYOFF TABLE, FIRST RECORD SHEET, 
SECOND RECORD SHEET, and EXPERIMENTAL CARDS. You also need an ID number. 
The instructor will provide all of these. 
 
 
Steps for Each Round 
 
1. Using  the  PAYOFF TABLE (given to you), decide how many months you will spend in 
the fishery. 
2. On the FIRST RECORD SHEET, write your decision (My Months in the Fishery) in 
Column A for the current round. 
3. On an EXPERIMENTAL CARD, write the round number, and your decision (My 
Months in the Fishery). Make sure it corresponds exactly to what you wrote on the FIRST 
RECORD SHEET. Hand the experimental card to the instructor. 
4. The instructor will collect all the experimental cards and give you written feedback on the 
TOTAL GROUP MONTHS and INDIVIDUAL MONTHS. 
5. On the FIRST RECORD SHEET, write this total in Column B (Total Group Months in 
the Fishery). 
6. On the FIRST RECORD SHEET, calculate Column C (Their Months in the Fishery).  
This equals Column B minus Column A. 
7. On the FIRST RECORD SHEET, write in Column D the total amount in ECU that you 
earned in this round. To know how much you earned, use the PAYOFF TABLE and 
columns A and C (My Months and Their Months).  
8.  On the SECOND RECORD SHEET, write down individual months, which were given 
by the instructor for each round. 





















FIRST RECORD SHEET 
NAME: _______________________________   ID: _______ 


















(Column B minus 
Column A) 
MY EARNINGS 




1         
2         
3         
…         
30         









ID:   
Round Number:   
















MY MONTHS IN THE FISHERY 
   0  1  2  3  4 5 6 7 8 
0  0 26  52  78  104,1 130,1 156,1 182,1 208,1 
1  0 26  52  78  104,1 130,1 156,1 182,1 208,1 
2  0 26  52  78  104,1 130,1 156,1 182,1 208,1 
3  0 26  52  78  104,1 130,1 156,1 182,1 208,1 
4  0 26  52  78  104,1 130,1 156,1 182,1 208,1 
5  0 26  52  78  104,1 130,1 156,1 182,1 208,1 
6  0 26  52  78  104,1 130,1 156,1 182,1 208,1 
7  0 26  52  78  104,1 130,1 156,1 182,1 208,1 
8  0 26  52  78  104,1 130,1 156,1 182,1 208,1 
9  0 26  52  78  104,1 130,1 156,1 182,1 208,1 
10  0 26  52  78  104,1 130,1 156,1 182,1 208,1 
11  0 26  52  78  104,1 130,1 156,1 182,1 208,1 
12  0 26  52  78  104,1 130,1 156,1 182,1 208,1 
13  0 26  52  78  104,1 130,1 156,1 182,1 208,1 
14  0 26  52  78  104,1 130,1 156,1 182,1 208,1 
15  0 26  52  78  104,1 130,1 156,1 182,1 208,1 
16  0 26  52  78  104,1 130,1 156,1 182,1 208,1 
17  0 26  52  78  104,1 130,1 156,1 182,1 193,3 
18  0 26  52  78  104,1 130,1 156,1 169,2 179,7 
19  0  26  52  78 104,1  130,1 145 157,2 167 
20  0 26  52  78  104,1 120,8 134,7 146,1 155,3 
21  0 26  52  78  96,7  112,3 125,3 135,9 144,3 
22  0 26  52  72,5  89,8  104,4 116,5 126,3 134,1 
23  0 26  48,3 67,4  83,5  97  108,2 117,4 124,6 
24  0  24,2  44,9  62,6 77,6 90,2 100,6 109 115,6 
25  0 22,5 41,8 58,2  72,2  83,8  93,4  101,2  107,2 
26  0  20,9  38,8  54,1  67,1 77,9 86,7 93,8 99,3 
27  0  19,4  36,1  50,3  62,3 72,3 80,4 86,9 91,8 
28  0  18  33,5  46,7  57,8  67  74,5 80,4 84,8 
29  0  16,8  31,1  43,4  53,6 62,1 68,9 74,2 78,1 
30  0  15,6  28,9  40,2  49,7 57,4 63,6 68,4 71,8 
31  0  14,5  26,8  37,2  45,9  53  58,6 62,8 65,8 
32  0  13,4  24,8  34,4  42,4 48,8 53,9 57,6 60,1 
33  0  12,4  23  31,8  39,1 44,9 49,4 52,6 54,7 
34  0  11,5  21,2  29,3  35,9 41,1 45,1 47,9 49,6 
35  0  10,6  19,5  26,9  32,9 37,6  41  43,4 44,6 
36  0  9,8 18  24,7  30,1 34,2 37,2 39,1 39,9 
37  0  9  16,5  22,5  27,4 31 33,5 35 35,5 
38  0 8,2  15  20,5  24,8  27,9  30  31  31,2 
39  0  7,5  13,7  18,6  22,3  25  26,6 27,3 27,1 
40  0  6,8  12,4  16,7 20  22,2 23,4 23,7 23,1 
41  0  6,2  11,2  15 17,7 19,5 20,3 20,2 19,3 
42  0  5,6 10  13,3  15,6 16,9 17,3 16,9 15,7 
43  0 5  8,9  11,7  13,5 14,5 14,5 13,8 12,2 
44  0  4,4 7,8  10,1  11,6 12,1 11,8 10,7  8,9 
45  0  3,9  6,8  8,7  9,7 9,8 9,2 7,8 5,7 
46  0  3,4  5,8  7,3  7,9  7,7  6,7 5 2,6 
47  0  2,9  4,8  5,9  6,1 5,6 4,3 2,2 -0,4 
48  0 2,4  3,9  4,6  4,4  3,5  1,9  -0,4  -3,3 
49  0  2 3,1  3,3 2,8  1,6 -0,3 -2,9 -6,1 
50  0  1,5  2,2  2,1 1,3 -0,3 -2,5 -5,3 -8,8 
51  0  1,1  1,4 1  -0,2 -2,1 -4,6 -7,7  -11,4 
52  0  0,7 0,6 -0,2 -1,7  -3,8  -6,6  -9,9 -13,9 
53  0 0,3  -0,1 -1,2  -3  -5,5  -8,5  -12,1  -16,3 
54  0  -0,1 -0,8 -2,3  -4,4  -7,1  -10,4 -14,3 -18,6 





























56  0 -0,8  -2,2  -4,3  -6,9  -10,2  -14  -18,3  -23,1 
20APPENDIX II 
 
Table A2: The Number of Votes Required to be Ostracised and the Cost Imposed 
on Remaining Members 
 
Number of Subjects 
Remaining 
Number of Votes Required 
to be Ostracised 
Cost from Exclusion on the 
Remaining Subjects 
8 4 0 
7 4  27 
6 3  56 
5 3  76 
4 2  114 
3 2  169 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21